Security gateway for MCP agents.
Block injection attacks, unauthorized access, and unsafe tool calls before they reach your production systems.
Block known attack patterns — path traversal, reverse shells, metadata poisoning, and SSRF — before they reach your systems. No model judgment required.
Detect subtle evasion attempts that signature rules miss. Optional intent scoring when you need deeper inspection beyond pattern matching.
Spot unusual behavior across sessions — unexpected data patterns, abnormal tool-call sequences, and signs of compromise before they escalate.
id: "ssrf_aws_metadata"
name: "AWS IMDSv2 Token Fetch"
layer: "L1_DETERMINISTIC"
action: "BLOCK_AND_ALERT"
severity: "CRITICAL"Run 'vanguard start' to launch the local gateway.
Gateway mode: point your MCP client to the proxy URL. Stdio mode: wrap the upstream server command.
Tool calls and server metadata are inspected before execution.
Emit audit logs and telemetry. Optionally route blocked events to external evidence systems.
Two Deployment Modes
Wraps the upstream MCP server command. Runs on the same machine as the agent. No network exposure — ideal for development and single-tenant deployments.
Exposes the proxy as a network service. Requires API key or JWT auth configuration. Enables multi-tenant and remote MCP server access.
Fail-Closed by Design
McpVanguard defaults to deny, not allow. When in doubt, it blocks. This applies to every layer:
CLI Tooling
vanguard startLaunch the local gateway or stdio proxy
vanguard auditRun compliance checks against active rules
vanguard updatePull signed rule updates from the registry
vanguard uiOpen the audit dashboard in your browser
VANGUARD_MODE=enforce
VANGUARD_RULES_DIR=./rules
VANGUARD_API_KEY=sk-live-...
VANGUARD_SEMANTIC_ENABLED=falserules:
- id: jailbreak_001
severity: CRITICAL
pattern: "ignore.*instructions"
action: BLOCK
reason: "Instruction override attempt"The Model Context Protocol — the open standard McpVanguard secures.
Adversarial text that overrides LLM instructions — detected by McpVanguard's metadata inspection and jailbreak.yaml ruleset.
Unauthorized tool invocation constrained by McpVanguard's policy enforcement boundary.
Agent-driven exploitation of internal services — blocked by network.yaml destination allowlists.
Filesystem escape via relative paths — normalized and blocked at the proxy boundary.
Rule-based, non-probabilistic enforcement — the architectural foundation of McpVanguard.
The formally defined perimeter that McpVanguard enforces for every agent session.
Every tool call is verified independently — McpVanguard's core security philosophy.